LBJ Alabamaga federal qo'shinlarni yuboradi

LBJ Alabamaga federal qo'shinlarni yuboradi

1965 yil 20 -martda Prezident Lindon B. Jonson Alabama gubernatori Jorj Uollesga federal hokimiyatdan foydalanib, Selmadan Montgomerigacha rejalashtirilgan fuqarolik huquqlari yurishini nazorat qilish uchun Alabama milliy gvardiyasini chaqirishi haqida xabar beradi.

Qo'rqitish va kamsitish ilgari Selmaning qora tanli aholisiga - shaharning yarmidan ko'piga - ro'yxatdan o'tishga va ovoz berishga to'sqinlik qilgan edi. 1965 yil 7 -mart, yakshanba kuni, 600 nafar namoyishchi guruhi poytaxt Montgomeri shahriga yo'l olishdi, bu huquqdan mahrum qilish va qora tanli Jimmi Li Jeksonning shtat askari tomonidan o'ldirilishiga qarshi.

Keyinchalik televidenie orqali namoyish qilingan shafqatsiz sahnalarda shtat va mahalliy politsiya yurish qatnashchilariga billi klublar va ko'z yoshartuvchi gaz bilan hujum qildi. Uzoq va uzoq televidenie tomoshabinlari tasvirlardan g'azablanishdi va janubiy xristian etakchilar konferentsiyasi (SCLC) rahbari Martin Lyuter Kingning "Qonli yakshanba" dan ikki kun o'tib norozilik yurishi uyushtirildi. King yurishni federal sudning roziligisiz o'tkazishdan ko'ra, yurish qiluvchilarni aylantirdi.

KO'PROQ O'QING: Fuqarolik huquqlari harakati xronologiyasi

18 -mart kuni Alabama shtati federal sudyasi uchinchi yurish davom etishi mumkinligi to'g'risida qaror chiqargach, prezident Jonson va uning maslahatchilari Selma -Montgomeriga ketayotgan King va uning namoyishchilarining xavfsizligini ta'minlash yo'lini topish uchun tezda harakat qilishdi. Ularning yo'lidagi eng kuchli to'siq, namoyishchilarni himoya qilish uchun har qanday davlat mablag'larini sarflashni istamagan, ochiq segregatsiyachi gubernator Uolles edi. Jonson, Oq uy tomonidan yozilgan telefon qo'ng'iroqlarida, Alabama milliy gvardiyasini tartibni saqlashga chaqiradi, deb va'da berganidan bir necha soat o'tgach, Uolles televizorga chiqdi va uning o'rniga federal qo'shinlarni yuborishni talab qildi.

G'azablangan Jonson Bosh prokuror Nikolas Katsenbaxga press -reliz yozishni aytdi, chunki Uolles o'z shtatida tartibni saqlash uchun 10 mingta qo'riqchidan foydalanishdan bosh tortgani uchun, Jonsonning o'zi qo'riqchini chaqirgan va ularga barcha yordam ko'rsatgan. Bir necha kundan so'ng, shtat va federal qo'shinlarning hushyor nazorati ostida 5400 mil masofada 50 ming yuruvchi qirolning orqasidan ergashdi.

25 -mart kuni Montgomeriga xavfsiz tarzda etib kelishganida, ular Kingning Kapitoliy binosi zinasidan o'zining mashhur "Qancha vaqt, uzoq emas" nutqini aytayotganini tomosha qilishdi. Jonson va Uolles o'rtasidagi to'qnashuv va Jonsonning hal qiluvchi harakati fuqarolik huquqlari harakatida muhim burilish nuqtasi bo'ldi. Besh oy ichida Kongress ovoz berish huquqi to'g'risidagi qonunni qabul qildi, uni Jonson g'urur bilan 1965 yil 6 -avgustda imzoladi.

KO'RING: O'rningdan ko'taril: Amerikani TARIX tonozida o'zgartirgan harakat


MLK o'ldirilganini eshitganida LBJ shunday qilgan

Kayl Longliis Snelllar oilasi dekanining Arizona shtati universitetining tarix va siyosatshunoslik professori. U ko'plab kitoblarning muallifi, shu jumladan LBJ 1968 yil: Amerikadagi inqilob yilidagi kuch, siyosat va prezidentlik(Kembrij, 2018).

LBJ 1964 yilda Oval idorada fuqarolik huquqlari rahbarlari ruhoniy Martin Lyuter King, Uitni Yang va Jeyms Farmer bilan uchrashuv.

1968 yil 4 -aprelda LBJ kuzatdi: "O'sha kuni dunyo menga juda yaxshi joydek tuyuldi".

Ammo u o'sha kuni kechqurun Demokratik jamg'armaga yig'ilishga tayyorlanayotganda, yozuv keldi: "Janob. Prezident: Martin Lyuter King otib tashlandi.

Ko'p o'tmay, yana bir xabar keldi: “Janob. Prezident: "Adolat faqat doktor King o'lganini aytdi."

LBJ achinib dedi: "Men kamdan -kam hollarda kuchsizlik tuyg'usini, Martin Lyuter King, o'ldirilgan kundan ko'ra o'tkirroq his qilganman".

Darhol Jonson Kongressning qo'shma yig'ilishida afro-amerikaliklar uchun keng qamrovli dasturni taqdim etish uchun maxsus murojaat qilishni rejalashtira boshladi. LBJ Kalifanoga: "Biz xalqqa biror narsa qilishimiz mumkinligini ko'rsatishimiz kerak", dedi.

Yordamchilar g'ayratli edilar, shuning uchun hafsalasi pir bo'lgan LBJ qichqirdi: "Jin ursin, bu mamlakat bu odamlar uchun ko'proq narsani qilishi kerak, va hozir boshlanish vaqti".

Bu erda bir necha kun ichida Jonson afro-amerikaliklarga hamdardlik va g'amxo'rlik ko'rsatgan. U zo'ravonlikni harakat orqali bostirishni juda xohlardi.

Ertasi kuni bo'lib o'tgan uchrashuvda LBJ namoyishchilarning his -tuyg'ularini tan oldi. "Agar men Garlemda bola bo'lganimda. Men hozir nima haqida o'ylayotganimni bilaman: men oq tanlilar o'z xalqiga ochiq mavsum deb e'lon qilishgan deb o'ylardim va agar men qurol olmasam va oldin ularni olib tashlamasam, ular bizni birma -bir olib tashlashadi. ”

Biroq, u jamoatchilikka "biz harakatsizlik, befarqlik va adolatsizlik toshlarini ag'darib tashladik", deb aytdi. Lekin biz boshladik. ”

Ko'p o'tmay, federal qo'shinlarni shaharlarda, shu jumladan Vashingtonda tartibsizlikni bostirishga chaqiriqlar keldi, qattiq harakatlar uchun yig'laganiga qaramay, Jonson qo'shimcha qon to'kilishini oldini olishga sodiq qoldi. U yordamchilaridan biriga shunday dedi: "Men amerikaliklarning amerikaliklarni o'ldirishlarini xohlamayman. Ehtimol, men mashhur ishni qilmayapman, hatto to'g'ri ish qilyapman, lekin Vashingtondagi hech bir askar hali tinch fuqaroni o'ldirgani yo'q.

Ammo, hatto u qon to'kilishini cheklashga harakat qilganda ham, LBJ hazil tuyg'usini saqlab qoldi. Hisobotlarga ko'ra, Stokli Karmaykl Jorjtaun shahridagi "hashamatli" uylar bo'ylab yurish uyushtirgan, Jonsonni tanqid qilishni yaxshi ko'radigan gazeta muharrirlari va sharhlovchilari.

Prezident hisobotni o'qigach, jilmayib qo'ydi va: «Jin ursin! Men bu kunni o'ttiz besh yil kutdim! ”

Qo'shinlar boshqa shaharlarga, shu jumladan Baltimor va Chikagoga kirib kelganda, prezident va uning xodimlari Kongress uchun 5 milliard dollardan ziyod takliflar ustida ishlashni davom ettirdilar.

Ammo Kongress qabul qilishi mumkin bo'lgan haqiqat ham bor edi. Bir yordamchi ta'kidladi: "Kongress biz u erga yuborgan narsaga ko'nmasa, negrga bo'lgan talabni kuchaytirishdan nima foyda?"

Ammo LBJ buni juda xohlaganiga qaramay, oqilona taklifni ishlab chiqa olmaslik muhim edi. Bir maslahatchi LBJ tavsiyanomalar bilan bir parcha qog'oz olganini esladi. U yuzini qimirlatib qo'ydi, chunki u ularni "bizning muammomizga hech qanday vanil" deb ta'riflamadi.

Keyin u masalaning mohiyatini aniqladi. "Hammamiz aqlli bo'lmagunimizcha, menimcha, mamlakat bor narsasi bilan shug'ullanishi kerak."

Katta reja yo'qligiga qaramay, prezident bitta sohada muvaffaqiyat qozondi - "Adolatli uy -joylar to'g'risida" gi qonun. Yillar davomida u turli tumanlar, shu jumladan rieltorlarning kuchli qarshiligiga qaramay, uni itarib yubordi.

Biroq, Oq uyning ko'p siyosatlashuvidan so'ng, qonun qabul qilindi. LBJ mag'rurlik bilan ta'kidladi: "qonun jarayonida biz eski adolatsizlik kishaniga abadiy zarba beramiz".

LBJ baxtli bo'lgach, ko'proq narsani xohladi: "Men Kongressni millionlab amerikaliklar uchun umid ishini tugatishga chaqiraman" va boshqa chora -tadbirlarni qabul qilib, "biz ijtimoiy adolat va taraqqiyot dasturlari bilan oldinga siljishimiz mumkin". Cho'loq o'rdak prezidenti saylov yilida tobora ko'proq konservativ Kongressga qarshi kurash olib borganida, hech narsa sodir bo'lmadi.

Shunga qaramay, 1972 yilda Jonson prezident kutubxonasida o'tkazilgan fuqarolik huquqlari konferentsiyasida ko'tarildi va shunday dedi: "Keling, nima qilinganini kuzataylik va u saqlanib qolganini ko'ramiz, lekin aytaylik, biz endi boshladik va davom etamiz. Bu zaminda tug'ilgan har bir o'g'il -qiz, qaysi davlat, qanday rang, bir tekisda turmaguncha, bizning ishimiz bajarilmaydi ”.

Bir oy o'tmay u vafot etdi. Afro-amerikaliklar va boshqalarning muammolarini hal qilish istagi va hamdardligi 1972 yilda, xuddi 1968 yildagidek, o'z aksini topdi. Ularning aks-sadosi bugungi kunda ham, ellik yildan keyin ham saqlanib qolmoqda.


Tarkibi

1963 yil 10 mayda shahar, mahalliy korxonalar va fuqarolik huquqlari kampaniyasi uchun muzokarachilar "Birmingem sulh bitimi" ni yakunlab, e'lon qilishdi. Shartnoma shahar va biznes majburiyatlarini qisman ajratish majburiyatlarini o'z ichiga olgan (chakana savdo do'konlaridagi jihozlangan xonalar, suv favvoralari va tushlik peshtaxtalari), afroamerikalik ishchilar uchun iqtisodiy o'sish va'dalari, namoyishlarda hibsga olinganlarni ozod qilish va irqiy muammolar va bandlik bo'yicha qo'mita. King va uning jamoasi joylashgan Gaston Motelda o'tkazilgan tushdan keyingi matbuot anjumanida, ruhoniy Fred Shattlsvort shartnoma versiyasini o'qidi, shundan so'ng King "buyuk g'alaba" ni e'lon qildi va shaharni tark etishga tayyorlandi. [1] Biroq, ba'zi oq tanli rahbarlar, shu jumladan namoyishchilarga qarshi itlar va o't o'chiruvchilar ishlatgan jamoat xavfsizligi buyuk shahar komissari Bull Konnor, kelishuvni rad etishdi va uning qoidalarini bajarmasliklarini taklif qilishdi. [2]

1963 yil 11 may kuni ertalab shtat qo'shinlari gubernator Jorj Uollesning buyrug'i bilan Birmingemdan chekinayotgan edi. Tergovchi Ben Allenga Klan ichidagi manba Gaston Motelini portlatish ehtimoli haqida ogohlantirgan va bu qo'shinlarga yana bir necha kun qolishni tavsiya qilgan. Allenning ogohlantirishiga jamoat xavfsizligi bo'yicha davlat direktori Al Lingo e'tibor bermadi, u Klan tahdidiga "g'amxo'rlik qilishi" mumkinligini aytdi. [3] Kichik Martin Lyuter King Birmingemdan Atlanta shahriga jo'nab ketdi. [4]

Shuningdek, 11 -may kuni kunduzi janub bo'ylab Klan rahbarlari Alabama shtatining yaqinidagi Bessemer shahrida yig'ilish uchun yig'ilishdi. Klan Imperial ustasi Robert Shelton oq tanlilarga murojaat qilib, "zo'ravon irqning ateist vazirlari yoki Birmingemdagi boshqa guruhlardan har qanday imtiyoz yoki talabni" rad etishga chaqirdi. [4] U, shuningdek, "Klansmen, agar kerak bo'lsa, Alabamadagi segregatsiyani himoya qilish uchun o'z jonini berishga tayyor bo'lishini" aytdi. [5] Ma'lum bo'lishicha, olomon ishtiyoqsiz edi, chunki ular ajralib chiqish tendentsiyasidan ruhiy tushkunlikka tushishdi. [6] Miting 22:15 da tugadi. [7]

O'sha kuni kechki soat 20:08 da Gaston Motel qirolga o'lim tahdidini oldi. iqtibos kerak ]

22:30 atrofida Birmingemning bir qancha politsiyachilari Muqaddas Oila shifoxonasi to'xtab turish joyidan chiqib ketishdi va Martin Lyuter Kingning akasi A. D. Kingning Ensli mahallasidagi uyiga qarab ketishdi. Ba'zi politsiyachilar belgilanmagan mashinada sayohat qilishdi. [8]

A. D. Shoh qarorgohi Tahrir

Taxminan 22:45 da, forma kiygan ofitser militsioner mashinasidan tushib, paketni A. D. King oldidagi ayvon yoniga qo'ydi. Ofitser mashinaga qaytdi. Mashina haydab ketayotganda, kimdir uyning derazasidan kichkina narsalarni trotuarga tashladi va u portladi. Kichkina, ammo kuchli portlash sodir bo'ldi va atrofdagi odam Ruzvelt Tatumni ag'darib yubordi. [7] [9]

Tatum o'rnidan turib, podshoh uyi tomon yo'l oldi - ayvon yaqinidagi boshqa katta, katta portlash bilan. Bu portlash uyning old qismini vayron qildi. Tatum tirik qoldi va uyning orqa tomoniga yugurdi, u erda A. D. King va uning rafiqasi Naomi besh farzandi bilan qochishga urinayotganini ko'rdi. [7] [9]

Tatum Kingga politsiya bomba etkazib berayotganini ko'rganini aytdi. King Federal tergov byurosiga (FTB) qo'ng'iroq qilib, mahalliy politsiya bo'limiga qarshi chora ko'rishni talab qildi. [10]

Gaston Motel tahrir

23:58 da, harakatlanayotgan mashinadan otilgan bomba Gaston Motelning 30 -xonasi ostida - Martin Lyuter King turgan xonada darhol portladi. Gaston Motel Afrikalik amerikalik tadbirkor A. G. Gastonga tegishli edi, u tez-tez Alabama xristian inson huquqlari harakatiga yordam berish uchun resurslar bilan ta'minlagan. Advokat va faol Orzell Billingsli 30 -xonada uxlamoqchi edi, chunki u muzokaralar kunlaridan charchagan va xotini er -xotinning uyida ziyofat uyushtirgan edi. Biroq, u shunchalik charchaganki, u erda kiyim uchun to'xtab, uyda uxlab qoldi. [11]

Motel bombasi butun shahar bo'ylab eshitildi. Bu ko'pchilik fuqarolik huquqlari namoyishlari paytida hibsga olingan balog'atga etmagan bolalar izolyatoridagi bolalarning qo'shig'ini to'xtatdi. Keyin bolalar qamoqxonaning karnaylari orqali bir necha bor "Diksi" qo'shig'ini aytgan oq tanli odamlarning ovozini eshitdilar. [12]

FBR xodimi Bryan Makfoll Klan muallifi Gari Rou Klan mitingi tugashi bilan 22:30 da hisobot berishini kutgan edi. [12] MakFall Rouni behuda qidirdi, uni soat 03:00 da Gaston Motel yonidagi VFW zalida topdi. Rou FBI boshqaruvchisi MakFallga qora tanli musulmonlar klanni ayblash uchun soxta bayroqni portlatishganini aytdi. McFall ishonch hosil qilmadi. [13] Biroq, FFR boshlig'i J. Edgar Xuverga o'z yakuniy hisobotini topshirar ekan, MakFall Klanni portlash uchun potentsial aybdor deb tan olmadi va Rowning axborot beruvchi sifatida ishonchliligiga shubha qilmadi. [14]

Zamonaviy tarixchilarning fikricha, portlashni Klanning to'rt a'zosi, shu jumladan Gari Rou va taniqli bombardimon Bill Xolt uyushtirgan. [15] Rouni allaqachon Klan hukumatning axborotchisi deb gumon qilgan va boshqa a'zolari uni oq ustunlik ishiga sodiqligini tekshirish uchun portlashga yordam berishga majbur qilgan bo'lishi mumkin. [12]

Ko'p afroamerikalik guvohlar qirol uyining portlashi uchun politsiyani javobgarlikka tortishdi va shu zahotiyoq o'z g'azablarini bildira boshladilar. Ba'zilar "Biz yengamiz" qo'shig'ini kuylay boshladilar, boshqalari tosh va boshqa mayda narsalarni tashlay boshladilar. [16] Ikkinchi portlashdan keyin ko'proq odamlar safarbar qilindi. Shanba kuni kechasi bo'lgani uchun, ko'pchilik kelishilganini nishonlashdi va ichishdi. Ularning ko'pchiligi Martin Lyuter King va uning janubiy xristian etakchilik konferentsiyasi tomonidan qo'llanilgan zo'ravonlik strategiyasidan hafsalasi pir bo'lgan va zo'ravonlikka aylangan. Uch afro-amerikalik erkak oq tanli politsiyachi J. N. Spiveyni qovurg'alaridan pichoqlagan. [17]

Barda ichgan bir necha muxbir umumiy ijaraga olingan mashinaga o'tirib, shov -shuv tomon yo'l olishdi. Taxminan 2500 kishilik olomon yig'ilib, Gaston Motel hududidan politsiya mashinalari va o't o'chirish mashinalarini to'sib qo'ydi. [18] Italiya oziq -ovqat do'konida boshlangan yong'in butun blokka tarqaldi. Trafik harakatlana boshlagach, Birmingem politsiyasi olti g'ildirakli zirhli mashinasini ko'chadan haydab, ko'z yosh oqizuvchi gaz sepdi. [19] AQSh armiyasining noma'lum tanki ham paydo bo'ldi. [20]

Tungi soat 2:30 da voqea joyiga Al Lingo qo'mondonligi va avtomatlar bilan qurollangan katta davlat harbiylari batalyoni etib keldi. 100 ga yaqin otlarga o'rnatilgan. Bu qo'shinlar ko'chada qolgan afro-amerikaliklarni, shuningdek motel foyesiga majburlangan oq tanli jurnalistlarni qo'rqitdi. [20] Kasalxonalarda 50 dan ortiq yaradorlar davolangan. [21]

Oq jurnalistlar va bir guruh qora tanlilar bombardimon qilingan motelda (ovqat va suvsiz) ertalabgacha qamal qilindi. [22] Og'ir qurolli kuchlar "bu sanoat shaharini berib", ko'chalarda patrullik qilishni davom ettirdilar. [23]

AQSh prezidenti Jon Kennedi vaziyatga javob berish uchun Kemp -Devidda (Mermend shtati, Turmont shahri yaqinida) ta'tilni erta tugatdi. [24] Federal qo'shinlarni yuborish to'g'risida ixtilofga tushib, Kennedi Birmingemdagi zo'ravonlik xalqaro yangiliklar sifatida yoritilgandan so'ng, yuzini saqlamoqchi edi va u yangi tuzilgan sulhni himoya qilmoqchi edi. Shu bilan birga, u odatdagi harbiy aralashuvlarni majburlaydigan pretsedentni o'rnatishni xohlamadi va federal "bosqinga" qarshi chiqqan oq tanli janubiy demokratlar o'rtasida qarshilik paydo bo'lishidan qo'rqdi. [25] Biroq, Kennedi nazarida, Birmingemda "qo'ldan chiqqan odamlar oq tanlilar emas, umuman olganda, negrlardir", bu esa aralashuvni yanada yoqimli qiladi. [26]

Kennedi televidenie va radio orqali "hukumat tartibni saqlash, o'z fuqarolarining hayotini himoya qilish uchun hamma narsani qiladi", deb e'lon qildi. U yaqin atrofdagi harbiy bazalardagi qo'shinlar uchun ogohlantirishni kuchaytirdi va Alabama milliy gvardiyasini federalizatsiya qilishni taklif qildi. U, shuningdek, Birmingem sulhiga vositachilik qilishda yordam berib, Vashingtonga qaytgan Adliya vazirligi advokati Burk Marshallni yubordi. [27] "Eman daraxti operatsiyasi" deb nomlangan Birmingemdagi armiya missiyasini general -mayor Creighton Abrams boshchiligida va bosh qarorgohi FBR bilan Birmingem federal binosida edi. [28] Operatsiyaning eng yuqori cho'qqisida (18 may) 18 mingga yaqin askar shahar inqiroziga javob berishga tayyor bo'lgan bir, ikki yoki to'rt soatlik ogohlantirish holatiga keltirildi. [29] [30]

Gubernator Uolles 14 may kuni "Eman daraxti" operatsiyasini bilib, shikoyat qildi. Bunga javoban Kennedi jimgina Operatsiya shtab -kvartirasini Fort Makkellanga ko'chirdi, bir necha ofitser federal binoda qoldi. [31] Uolles yana Oliy sudga shikoyat qildi. Sud Kennedi AQSh Kodeksining X 333 -bo'limida o'z vakolatlarini amalga oshirayotganiga javoban: "Bunday tayyorgarlik choralari va ularning da'vogarlarga salbiy ta'sir ko'rsatishi hech qanday yengillik berishga asos bo'lolmaydi", dedi. [31]

Amaliyotning samarasizligi Shtab boshliqlarini uy ichidagi fuqarolik tartibsizliklariga tayyorgarlik to'g'risida eslatma tuzishga undadi. Ushbu eslatmaga ko'ra, yangi tashkil etilgan Strike qo'mondonligi "mustahkamlangan kompaniyadan tortib 15000 kishilik maksimal kuchga qadar tayyor bo'ladigan, moslashtirilgan armiya kuchlarini ko'chirishi" kerak. [32] Strike qo'mondonligi fuqarolik tartibsizliklariga javob berish uchun yetti armiya brigadasini (21 mingga yaqin askar) tayinladi. [33] Operatsiya, shuningdek, harbiylarni avtonom razvedka yig'ishdagi sa'y -harakatlarini hamda FTB bilan hamkorlikni kuchaytirishga olib keldi. [34]

Birmingem faoli Avraam Vuds bu tartibsizlikni 1967 yildagi fuqarolik huquqlari to'g'risidagi qonun qabul qilinganidan keyin sodir bo'lgan tartibsizliklar to'lqinining "oldingi" deb baholadi va o'zgarishlarning sekin sur'atida norozilik bildirdi. [35] "Eman daraxti" operatsiyasi Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining zamonaviy tarixida birinchi marta federal hukumat fuqarolik tartibsizliklariga javoban harbiy kuchni ishga solgan, bu qonuniy kuchga kirmagan. [30]

Nyu -Yorklik kongressmen Adam Kleyton Pauell, agar Kennedi Birmingemda ham, milliy miqyosda ham fuqarolik huquqlari bo'yicha tez harakat qilmasa, tartibsizliklar butun mamlakat bo'ylab, shu jumladan Vashington poytaxtiga ham tarqalishini ogohlantirdi. [36] Malkolm X Pauellning ogohlantirishini, shuningdek, uning prezidentni tanqid qilganini tasdiqladi. [37]

Malkolm, Birmingem inqiroziga federal javobni buzilgan ustuvorliklar isboti sifatida keltirdi: [38]

Prezident Kennedi Alabama shtatiga itlar qora chaqaloqlarni tishlayotgan paytda qo'shin yubormadi. Vaziyat portlashini uch hafta kutdi. Keyin negrlar o'zlarini himoya qilish qobiliyatini namoyish qilgandan keyin qo'shin yubordi. Alabama muharrirlari bilan suhbatda Kennedi negrlarga to'g'ri munosabatda bo'lishni talab qilmadi, chunki bu to'g'ri. Uning so'zlariga ko'ra, agar negrlarga yaxshi muomala qilinmasa, musulmonlar tahdidga aylanadi. U o'zgarishni bu to'g'ri bo'lgani uchun emas, balki dunyo bu mamlakatni kuzatayotgani uchun chaqirdi. Kennedi noto'g'ri, chunki uning motivatsiyasi noto'g'ri.

Keyinchalik Malkolm X o'zining "Maysa ildizlariga xabar" nomli nutqida shunday dedi:

Aytgancha, o'sha paytda Birmingem portladi, Birmingemdagi negrlar - eslang, ular ham portlashdi. Ular krakerlarni orqa tomondan pichoqlay boshladilar va boshlari bilan tepa boshladilar - ha, shunday qilishdi. O'shanda Kennedi Birmingemga qo'shin yuborgan. Shunday qilib, darhol Kennedi televizorga chiqdi va "bu axloqiy masala" dedi.

Malkolm Xning bahosi asosan zamonaviy stipendiyalar bilan tasdiqlangan. Prezident Kennedi fuqarolik huquqlari siyosati to'g'risida qaror qabul qilishning eng keng qamrovli tadqiqotining muallifi Nikolas Bryant ta'kidlashicha, Birmingemning asosan zo'ravonliksiz kampaniyasi davomida Kennedi zo'ravonlik aralashuvi yoki yangi qonunchilik majburiyatini olishdan bosh tortgan. U afro-amerikalik yoshni yirtib tashlagan politsiya itining xalqaro miqyosda e'lon qilingan kuchli fotosurati ta'siriga qarshilik ko'rsatdi. Uning ta'kidlashicha, qonunchilik holati umidsiz edi va u Birmingemdagi voqealar bitta deputatning ovoz berish niyatiga ta'sir qiladi deb o'ylamagan. Kennedi [politsiya iti] tasvirining kuchli ramziy qiymatini tan olgan bo'lsa -da, u o'ziga xos ramziy ishorasi bilan unga qarshi turishni xohlamadi. ”[39] Brayan xulosa qiladi:

Bu 11-maydagi qora-oq zo'ravonlik edi-bir hafta oldin hayratlanarli fotosurat nashr etilmagan-bu Kennedi tafakkuridagi haqiqiy suv havzasi va ma'muriyat siyosatidagi burilish nuqtasi edi. Kennedi fuqarolik huquqlari namoyishchilariga qarshi segregatsionistik hujumlarga o'rganib qolgan edi. Ammo u, akasi va ma'muriyatning boshqa amaldorlari bilan birga, qora tanli to'dalarning yugurib yurishidan ko'proq xavotirda edi. [40]

Timoti Tayson bu pozitsiyani tasdiqlaydi va yozadi: "Zo'ravonlik SCLCning g'alabasiga tahdid solgan, lekin Oq uyning fuqarolik huquqlarini qo'llab -quvvatlashiga yordam bergan. Bu fuqarolik huquqlari harakatining istehzolaridan biri edi, zo'ravonlik tahdidi muvaffaqiyat uchun juda muhim edi. zo'ravonlik to'g'risida ". [41] Bu aloqani boshqa ko'plab tarixchilar, jumladan Xovard Zin, [42] Kleyborn Karson, [43] Glenn Eskyu [44] va Gari Yonj qayd etgan. [45]

1963 yil 12 mayda Oq uy yig'ilishining maxfiy yozuvlari ko'pincha bu fikrni qo'llab -quvvatlaydi:

Robert Kennedi: Negro aziz xodimi Walker. Uning so'zlariga ko'ra, negrlar, bugun kechqurun qorong'i tushganda, ular militsionerlarning ortidan keta boshlaydilar - boshini ovlab - militsionerlarni o'ldirish uchun otishmoqchi. Uning aytishicha, bu butunlay qo'ldan chiqqan. Siz hozir butun mamlakat bo'ylab zo'ravonlikni boshlashingiz mumkin, negrlar aytishicha, ular bu yillar davomida tahqirlangan va endi ular qora musulmonlarning g'oyalariga amal qilishadi. Agar ular, boshqa tomondan, federal hukumat ularning do'sti, ular uchun aralashayotganini, ular uchun ishlayotganini his qilsalar, bu ularning bir qismini hal qiladi. Menimcha, bu biror narsa qilish uchun eng kuchli dalil.

Prezident Kennedi: Birinchidan, bizda qonun va tartib bo'lishi kerak, shuning uchun negrlar butun shahar bo'ylab yugurmaydi. Agar [mahalliy Birmingemni ajratish] bitimi buzilsa, bizda boshqa shart - bu javob chorasi sifatida qonunni shu hafta Kongressga yuborishdir. Yengillik sifatida biz qonunga ega bo'lishimiz kerak. [46]


LBJ federal qo'shinlarni Alabama shtatiga yuboradi: 1965

1965 yilning shu kuni, Prezident Lindon B. Jonson Alabama shtati gubernatori Jorj Uollesga federal hokimiyatdan foydalanib, Selmadan Montgomerigacha rejalashtirilgan fuqarolik huquqlari yurishini nazorat qilish uchun Alabama milliy gvardiyasini chaqirishi haqida xabar beradi.

Qo'rqitish va kamsitish ilgari Selmaning qora tanli aholisi va shaharning yarmidan ko'pini ro'yxatga olish va ovoz berishdan saqlagan edi. 1965 yil 7 -mart, yakshanba kuni, 600 nafar namoyishchi guruhi poytaxt Montgomeri shahriga yo'l olishdi, bu huquqdan mahrum qilish va qora tanli Jimmi Li Jeksonning shtat askari tomonidan o'ldirilishiga qarshi. Keyinchalik televidenie orqali namoyish qilingan shafqatsiz sahnalarda shtat va mahalliy politsiya yurish qatnashchilariga billi klublar va ko'z yoshartuvchi gaz bilan hujum qildi. Uzoq va uzoq televidenie tomoshabinlari tasvirlardan g'azablanishdi va SCLCLC Janubiy Xristian Liderlik Konferentsiyasi boshlig'i Martin Lyuter King tomonidan o'tkazilgan qonli yakshanbadan ikki kun o'tib norozilik yurishi uyushtirildi. King yurishni federal sud roziligisiz o'tkazishdan ko'ra, yuruvchilarni aylantirdi.

Prezident Lyndon B. Jonson kichik Martin Lyuter King bilan uchrashdi (Foto: Vikipediya)

18 -mart kuni Alabama shtati federal sudyasi uchinchi yurish davom etishi mumkinligi to'g'risida qaror chiqargach, prezident Jonson va uning maslahatchilari Selma -Montgomeriga ketayotgan King va uning namoyishchilarining xavfsizligini ta'minlash yo'lini topish uchun tezda harakat qilishdi. Ularning yo'lidagi eng kuchli to'siq, namoyishchilarni himoya qilish uchun har qanday davlat mablag'larini sarflashni istamagan, ochiq-oydin anti-integratsion gubernator Uolles edi. Oq uy yozgan Jonsonga telefon qo'ng'iroqlarini va'da qilganidan bir necha soat o'tgach, Uolas televizorga chiqdi va Jonsondan federal qo'shinlarni yuborishni talab qildi.

1965 yilda Alabama shtatining Selma shahridan Montgomeri shahrigacha bo'lgan fuqarolik huquqlari marshida qatnashayotganlar, ba'zilari Amerika bayroqlarini ko'tarib yurishgan (Foto: Vikipediya)

G'azablangan Jonson Bosh prokuror Nikolas Katsenbaxga press -reliz yozishni aytdi, chunki Uolles o'z shtatida tartibni saqlash uchun 10 mingta qo'riqchidan foydalanishdan bosh tortgani uchun, Jonsonning o'zi qo'riqchini chaqirgan va ularga barcha yordam ko'rsatgan. Bir necha kun o'tgach, 50,000 yurish qatnashchilari shtat va federal qo'shinlarning hushyor nazorati ostida 54 mil narida qirolning orqasidan ergashdilar. 25 -mart kuni Montgomeriga xavfsiz tarzda etib kelganlarida, ular Kingning Kapitoliy binosi zinasidan o'zining mashhur "Qanchalik uzoq emas" nomli nutqini o'qishini tomosha qilishdi. Jonson va Uolles o'rtasidagi to'qnashuv fuqarolik huquqlari harakatining muhim burilish nuqtasi bo'ldi. Besh oy ichida Kongress ovoz berish huquqi to'g'risidagi qonunni qabul qildi, uni Jonson g'urur bilan 1965 yil 6 avgustda qonun bilan imzoladi.


AQSh tarixida 1807 yildagi qo'zg'olon qonuni 14 marta chaqirilgan

Vashington, Prezident Trumpning 1807 yildagi qo'zg'olon qonunini qo'llash tahdidi, bu qonun 21 -asrda birinchi marta ishlatilishi mumkinligini anglatadi.

AQSh federal qonuni prezidentga fuqarolik tartibsizligi, qo'zg'olon va isyonni, boshqa tahdidlarni bostirish uchun o'z mamlakatiga harbiy qo'shinlarni joylashtirishga ruxsat beradi. Bu prezidentga Milliy gvardiyani federallashtirishga va AQSh qurolli kuchlaridan shtatlar va federal hukumatga qarshi qo'zg'olonlarga qarshi kurashda foydalanish imkonini beradi.

Prezident Tomas Jefferson imzolagan qonun 14 marta chaqirilgan, oxirgi marta 1992 yilda prezident Jorj Bush Rodni King hukmidan keyin Los -Anjeles okrugidagi tartibsizliklarga javoban.

Los -Anjelesning to'rt politsiyachisi Kingni zo'ravonlik bilan hibsga olish paytida haddan tashqari kuch ishlatishda aybsiz deb topildi, bu qaror butun mamlakat bo'ylab irqiy tartibsizliklar va zo'ravonliklarga sabab bo'ldi.

Zamonaviy davrda, prezidentlar, odatda, Amerikaning irqiy mojarolaridan aziyat chekish huquqini o'z zimmalariga oldilar, hatto janubning tubida federal fuqarolik huquqlarini himoya qilish qoidalariga tayanishdi.

1957 yilda Prezident Duayt D. Eyzenxauer AQSh armiyasining 101 -havo -desant bo'linmasidan Arkanzas gubernatori Orval Faubusdan keyin to'qqiz qora tanli o'quvchini xavfsizlikni ta'minlash niqobi ostida Arkanzas milliy gvardiyasi yordamida xavfsiz tarzda kuzatib borishga chaqirdi. o'quvchilarning maktabga kirishiga to'sqinlik qilishga urindi.

Prezident Jon F. Kennedi 1962 va 1963 yillarda qo'zg'olon qonunini chaqirib, fuqarolik huquqlari qonunlarini bajarish uchun Missisipi va Alabama shtatlariga federal qo'shinlarni yubordi. 1967 yilda Prezident Lindon B. Jonson politsiya va aholi o'rtasida halokatli tartibsizliklar boshlanganda 82 va 101 -havo -desant bo'linmalarini Detroytga yubordi va 1968 yilda Martin Lyuter Kingning o'ldirilishi natijasida boshlangan noroziliklarga javoban qonunni qayta chaqirdi.

Va 1992 yilda Prezident Jorj H.W. Bush Kaliforniya gubernatori Pit Uilsonning Rodni Kingni shafqatsizlarcha kaltaklagan LAPDning to'rt nafar ofitserining oqlanishidan so'ng Los -Anjelesdagi tartibsizliklarni bostirishga yordam berish haqidagi iltimosiga javob berdi.

Qonun 2001 yil 11 sentyabrdagi hujumlardan so'ng prezident hokimiyatini kengaytirish uchun qayta ko'rib chiqilgan va 2005 yilda Katrina bo'ronidan keyin foydalanish rejalashtirilgan bo'lsa -da, Bush ma'muriyati Nyu Orleanga minglab faol askarlarni yuborish uchun boshqa organlardan foydalangan.


LBJ fuqarolik huquqlari yurishini himoya qilish uchun federal qo'shinlarni Alabamaga yuboradi

Podpolkovnik Charli Braun

kampaniya = hist-tdih-2021-0320
1965 yil 20 -martda Prezident Lindon B. Jonson Alabama gubernatori Jorj Uollesga federal hokimiyatdan foydalanib, Selmadan Montgomerigacha rejalashtirilgan fuqarolik huquqlari yurishini nazorat qilish uchun Alabama milliy gvardiyasini chaqirishi haqida xabar beradi.

Qo'rqitish va kamsitish ilgari Selmaning qora tanli aholisiga - shaharning yarmidan ko'piga - ro'yxatdan o'tishga va ovoz berishga to'sqinlik qilgan edi. 1965 yil 7 -mart, yakshanba kuni, 600 nafar namoyishchi guruhi poytaxt Montgomeri shahriga yo'l olishdi, bu huquqdan mahrum qilish va qora tanli Jimmi Li Jeksonning shtat askari tomonidan o'ldirilishiga qarshi.

Keyinchalik televidenie orqali namoyish qilingan shafqatsiz sahnalarda shtat va mahalliy politsiya yurish qatnashchilariga billi klublar va ko'z yoshartuvchi gaz bilan hujum qildi. Uzoq va uzoq televidenie tomoshabinlari tasvirlardan g'azablanishdi va janubiy xristian etakchilar konferentsiyasi (SCLC) rahbari Martin Lyuter Kingning "Qonli yakshanba" dan ikki kun o'tib norozilik yurishi uyushtirildi. King yurishni federal sudning roziligisiz o'tkazishdan ko'ra, yurish qiluvchilarni aylantirdi.

KO'PROQ O'QING: Fuqarolik huquqlari harakati xronologiyasi

18 -mart kuni Alabama shtati federal sudyasi uchinchi yurish davom etishi mumkinligi to'g'risida qaror chiqargach, prezident Jonson va uning maslahatchilari Selma -Montgomeriga ketayotgan King va uning namoyishchilarining xavfsizligini ta'minlash yo'lini topish uchun tezda harakat qilishdi. Ularning yo'lidagi eng kuchli to'siq, namoyishchilarni himoya qilish uchun har qanday davlat mablag'larini sarflashni istamagan, ochiq segregatsiyachi gubernator Uolles edi. Jonson, Oq uy tomonidan yozilgan telefon qo'ng'iroqlarida, Alabama milliy gvardiyasini tartibni saqlashga chaqiradi, deb va'da berganidan bir necha soat o'tgach, Uolles televizorga chiqdi va uning o'rniga federal qo'shinlarni yuborishni talab qildi.

G'azablangan Jonson Bosh prokuror Nikolas Katsenbaxga press -reliz yozishni aytdi, chunki Uolles o'z shtatida tartibni saqlash uchun 10 mingta qo'riqchidan foydalanishdan bosh tortgani uchun, Jonsonning o'zi qo'riqchini chaqirgan va ularga barcha yordam ko'rsatgan. Bir necha kun o'tgach, shtat va federal qo'shinlarning hushyor nazorati ostida 5400 mil masofada 50 ming yuruvchi qirolning orqasidan ergashdi.

25 -mart kuni Montgomeriga xavfsiz tarzda etib kelishganida, ular Kingning Kapitoliy binosi zinasidan o'zining mashhur "Qancha vaqt, uzoq emas" nutqini aytayotganini tomosha qilishdi. Jonson va Uolles o'rtasidagi to'qnashuv va Jonsonning hal qiluvchi harakati fuqarolik huquqlari harakatida muhim burilish nuqtasi bo'ldi. Besh oy ichida Kongress ovoz berish huquqi to'g'risidagi qonunni qabul qildi, uni Jonson g'urur bilan 1965 yil 6 -avgustda imzoladi.


LBJ federal qo'shinlarni Alabamaga yuboradi - 1965 yil 20 -mart - HISTORY.com

TSgt Jo C.

Bu erda va#x27 20 -martdagi asosiy hikoya.

1965 yilning shu kunida Prezident Lindon B. Jonson Alabama gubernatori Jorj Uollesga federal hokimiyatdan foydalanib, Almaama milliy gvardiyasini Selmadan Montgomerigacha rejalashtirilgan fuqarolik huquqlari yurishini nazorat qilish uchun chaqirishi haqida xabar beradi.

Qo'rqitish va kamsitishlar ilgari Selmaning qora tanli aholisini - shaharning yarmidan ko'pini - ro'yxatdan o'tishga va ovoz berishga to'sqinlik qilgan edi. 1965 yil 7 -mart, yakshanba kuni 600 nafar namoyishchi guruhi poytaxt Montgomeri shahriga yo'l olishdi, bu huquqdan mahrum qilish va qora tanli Jimmi Li Jeksonning shtat askari tomonidan o'ldirilishiga qarshi. Keyinchalik televidenie orqali namoyish etilgan shafqatsiz sahnalarda shtat va mahalliy politsiya yurish qatnashchilariga billi klublar va ko'z yoshartuvchi gaz bilan hujum qildi. Uzoq va uzoq televidenie tomoshabinlari bu tasvirlardan g'azablanishdi va janubiy xristian etakchilik konferentsiyasi (SCLC) rahbari Martin Lyuter Kingning "Qonli yakshanba" dan ikki kun o'tib norozilik yurishi uyushtirildi. King turned the marchers around, however, rather than carry out the march without federal judicial approval.

After an Alabama federal judge ruled on March 18 that a third march could go ahead, President Johnson and his advisers worked quickly to find a way to ensure the safety of King and his demonstrators on their way from Selma to Montgomery. The most powerful obstacle in their way was Governor Wallace, an outspoken anti-integrationist who was reluctant to spend any state funds on protecting the demonstrators. Hours after promising Johnson–in telephone calls recorded by the White House–that he would call out the Alabama National Guard to maintain order, Wallace went on television and demanded that Johnson send in federal troops instead.

Furious, Johnson told Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach to write a press release stating that because Wallace refused to use the 10,000 available guardsmen to preserve order in his state, Johnson himself was calling the guard up and giving them all necessary support. Several days later, 50,000 marchers followed King some 54 miles, under the watchful eyes of state and federal troops. Arriving safely in Montgomery on March 25, they watched King deliver his famous “How Long, Not Long” speech from the steps of the Capitol building. The clash between Johnson and Wallace–and Johnson’s decisive action–was an important turning point in the civil rights movement. Within five months, Congress had passed the Voting Rights Act, which Johnson proudly signed into law on August 6, 1965.


Voting Rites

Thirty-five years ago this month, with Selma, Alabama, erupting in violence over the issue of race, LBJ changed the course of history.

ON MARCH 13, 1965, Lyndon Johnson met with George Wallace in the Oval Office. Six days earlier, in a confrontation that would come to be known as Bloody Sunday, the nation had watched in horror as Alabama state troopers attacked more than six hundred black activists who were marching from Selma to Montgomery. Armed only with the desire to vote, the marchers were turned back with nightsticks and tear gas. Wallace, in his first term as Alabama&rsquos governor, had designs on national office and hoped to salvage his reputation Johnson was under pressure to send in federal troops. With protesters outside the White House criticizing his apparent inaction &mdash some carrying signs that read &ldquoLBJ, Just You Wait, See What Happens in &rsquo68&rdquo &mdash the president directed Wallace to a soft couch. Nearly a foot shorter than Johnson, he promptly sank into its cushions. The president pulled up a rocking chair and leaned in close. The Johnson treatment had begun.

Over the next three hours, LBJ pressed Wallace on the issue of race. Careful not to let the governor play the martyr for states&rsquo rights, he cajoled and flattered him. When the president asked him why he wouldn&rsquot integrate the schools and let black residents register to vote, Wallace said that he didn&rsquot have the power. Johnson thundered in response, &ldquoGeorge, don&rsquot you shit me as to who runs Alabama.&rdquo In the end Johnson questioned Wallace&rsquos place in history: &ldquoGeorge, you and I shouldn&rsquot be thinking about 1965 we should be thinking about 1985. . . . Now, you got a lot of poor people down there in Alabama . . . a lot of people who need jobs, a lot of people who need a future. You could do a lot for them. Now, in 1985, George, what do you want left behind? Do you want a great big marble monument that says &lsquoGeorge Wallace: He Built&rsquo? Or do you want a little piece of scrawny pine lying there along that harsh caliche soil that says &lsquoGeorge Wallace: He Hated&rsquo?&rdquo

Shortly after the meeting, Wallace agreed to ask the president to send in federal troops. The governor, who just two years before had declared, &ldquoSegregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever,&rdquo would later say, &ldquoHell, if I&rsquod stayed in there much longer, he&rsquod have had me coming out for civil rights.&rdquo On March 15, Johnson addressed a joint session of Congress to propose what would become the Voting Rights Act of 1965. It was a bill he had always wanted, for reasons political and personal: Its passage would signify that a Southern president &mdash bu Southern president &mdash had broken the longstanding traditions that had kept blacks from voting and the South from gaining equal moral and economic status with the rest of the nation.

Thirty-five years later, the effects of that landmark legislation can still be felt. In the 2000 presidential race, for instance, Democratic candidates Al Gore and Bill Bradley have made minority issues a centerpiece of their campaigns, embracing everything from affirmative action to the removal of the Confederate flag flying above the South Carolina statehouse. Republican front-runner George W. Bush, meanwhile, is pushing the big tent theory &mdash that the GOP can prosper only if it appeals to minorities indeed, he has appointed blacks and Hispanics to top jobs in his campaign, just as he has tapped them for prominent posts in state government. For all that, and for other advances in race relations, LBJ&rsquos leadership was crucial.

How did Johnson become the president, as he liked to say, who finished what Lincoln started? Although as a congressman and a senator he had seemingly grown more and more conservative, withholding support for civil rights bills, he did an about-face in 1957. Maybe it was his yearning to be a national politician who could run for president maybe it was his lifelong identification with underdogs. Whatever the case, as the Senate majority leader, he shepherded President Dwight D. Eisenhower&rsquos civil rights legislation past a group of hostile senators &mdash the first bill of its kind passed since Reconstruction. Four years later, as John F. Kennedy&rsquos vice president, he spoke out even more forcefully on the issue. Yet when JFK sent a sweeping civil rights bill to Congress in June 1963, Johnson was outraged that he was barely consulted. Unhappy in the political shadows, Johnson told one of his aides, &ldquoMy future is behind me.&rdquo A tragic November day in Dallas would change all that.

Within hours of taking office, Johnson was laying the groundwork for his accidental administration. &ldquoWe got to his home at nine-thirty or ten o&rsquoclock that night, so he had only been president for about nine hours,&rdquo says Jack Valenti, who was a special assistant to LBJ. &ldquoI spent the night with him, as did [aides] Cliff Carter and Bill Moyers. We were all grouped in his bedroom, and until four in the morning, the three of us sat around his bed. He was in his pajamas, and we watched television as the commentators discussed this alien cowboy who was now the leader of the free world. He said, &lsquoThe first thing I&rsquom going to do is get that tax cut. Then I&rsquom going to pass Kennedy&rsquos civil rights bill, which has been languishing too goddammed long.&rsquo Then he said, &lsquoI&rsquom going to get another bill that&rsquos going to make it possible for everybody to vote without being harassed or having to pay money.&rsquo The germ of the Voting Rights Act was squirming around in his head on the first night that he was president.&rdquo

Johnson moved on Kennedy&rsquos civil rights bill, which seemed to have a slim chance of passing. &ldquoWhat Kennedy didn&rsquot do was put his political capital on the line,&rdquo says Valenti. &ldquoJohnson believed that the Kennedy administration didn&rsquot seize the moral authority.&rdquo To legitimize his position as a president for all the people, Johnson marshaled the full force of his office. Advisers told him to wait until after the 1964 election, if ever, to make his push. Johnson refused. He twisted arms, bargained with enemies, and ran roughshod over friends like Richard Russell, the Georgia senator who was most responsible for his rise to power in the Senate. Even the longest filibuster in Senate history &mdash by a bloc of Southern senators &mdash couldn&rsquot prevent passage of the bill. Though most of the voting rights provisions had been gutted, the bill outlawed discrimination in public places and in employment and brought an end to &ldquocolored&rdquo restrooms and segregated lunch counters. It was an extraordinary victory, though it was never entirely Johnson&rsquos. When Robert F. Kennedy gave an aide a pen that Johnson had used to sign the legislation on July 2, 1964, he inscribed the following words: &ldquoPen used to sign President Kennedy&rsquos civil rights bill.&rdquo

The night that the bill became law, with the 1964 presidential election just four months away, Johnson realized how his leadership might destroy the Democratic party in the South. Sitting on his bed among newspapers that chronicled the day&rsquos historic event, he told Moyers, &ldquoI think we just delivered the South to the Republican party for a long time to come.&rdquo In November Landslide Lyndon received 61 percent of the popular vote, more than any other candidate in the twentieth century. But despite his victory over Barry Goldwater, it was already clear that LBJ&rsquos premonition was coming true. Goldwater, who had opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, carried only six states. One was his home state of Arizona. The other five were Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina.

As Johnson prepared for his first full term, he focused on problems that would affect the nation by the year 2000. He formed task forces to provide solutions to such problems as funding for education and inadequate health insurance for the elderly. He deliberately stayed away from civil rights, even though he wanted a voting rights bill. &ldquoHe believed there needed to be a pause in the effort,&rdquo says Johnson biographer Robert Dallek. &ldquoHe worried that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would produce violent opposition in the South, though he was wrong on that count: Violence never materialized.&rdquo Still, in December he privately instructed Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach to begin looking into legislation that could be introduced when the time was right. &ldquoI tried to slow him down,&rdquo Katzenbach recalls today, &ldquobut he wanted his own civil rights bill.&rdquo With Katzenbach working behind the scenes, LBJ waited for a reason to move forward.

Martin Luther King, Jr., gave him one. On the day after the presidential election, King told the New York Times that he was ready to organize marches across the South in an effort to secure black Americans the right to vote. In Mississippi only 6 percent of eligible blacks were registered. In Alabama only about 20 percent were registered, but in Selma, it was fewer than 1 percent for that reason, the city would become a focal point. Starting in January, black protesters met with violence at the hands of white police officers, and they were arrested in great numbers. Newspapers tallied the results: &ldquoDr. King and 770 Others Seized&rdquo &ldquo520 More Seized.&rdquo One state trooper reportedly told a marcher, &ldquoSing one more freedom song and you are under arrest.&rdquo On the day King was released from jail, an ad written in his voice appeared in the Times: &ldquoThere are more Negroes in jail with me than there are on the voting rolls.&rdquo

By February King was urging Johnson to act, but the president moved cautiously. Johnson knew that back-to-back civil rights bills could cause an electoral backlash, not only in the South but across the rest of the country. And despite calls for federal troops to protect the protesters, he stood firm: sending soldiers in would cause the Democratic party to lose every white Southern vote. Johnson argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 needed time to work, but he said that Congress would receive a voting rights bill by year&rsquos end.

That timetable quickly changed. On February 26 a black protester died after being shot by a state trooper in Selma. March 7 brought Bloody Sunday, and two days later a white minister sympathetic to the civil rights movement was beaten by a white mob he died the next day. Selma came to a boiling point, and Johnson was criticized for his slow reaction by the same activists he wanted to help. He knew he had to act with Wallace in line, it was finally time. &ldquoJohnson was a great believer in timing,&rdquo says Valenti. &ldquoAfter Selma, he seized that moment like a trout going after a fly.&rdquo

In his address to both houses of Congress on March 15, LBJ said, &ldquoWhat happened in Selma is part of a far larger movement which reaches into every section and state of America. It is the effort of American Negroes to secure for themselves the full blessings of American life. Their cause must be our cause too. Because it&rsquos not just Negroes, but really it&rsquos all of us, who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice.&rdquo Appropriating the language of the civil rights movement itself, he added, &ldquoAnd we shall overcome.&rdquo Congress responded with a standing ovation.

The Voting Rights Act passed the Senate on May 26, the House on July 9. On August 6 Johnson signed it into law. In typical fashion, he did so in the same room in which Lincoln had signed the Emancipation Proclamation. So many people wanted a pen commemorating the day that LBJ used different ones for different parts of the letters in his name. And for good reason: The bill was in many ways more important than the Civil Rights Act. It suspended all literacy tests in seven of the former Confederate states and placed federal examiners in counties where black registration was below a prescribed level. For Johnson, it became the centerpiece of the Great Society, a sign that he could accomplish anything. Even Vietnam seemed, at that point, winnable.

The optimism would soon shatter. After the Civil Rights Act was enacted the previous year, Johnson had told civil rights leader Roy Wilkins, &ldquoOur troubles are just beginning. I guess you know that.&rdquo He&rsquod feared widespread violence by whites in the South. Though it never happened then, rioting broke out in the black Los Angeles neighborhood of Watts five days after Johnson signed the 1965 bill. When it was over, more than thirty people were dead and six hundred arrested. &ldquoJohnson was shocked by it,&rdquo says Dallek. &ldquoThat was one thing that pained him throughout the administration. He kept saying, &lsquoLook at everything I&rsquove done for black Americans. Why are they doing this to me?'&rdquo As riots spread to cities like Detroit and Newark, he wasn&rsquot the only one to sense a shift in the content and direction of civil rights. In 1964 only one third of all Americans thought that racial change was coming too fast. Two years later, 85 percent did.

Yet Johnson ultimately accomplished what he wanted. Morally, the nation is united on much higher ground than anyone ever could have imagined. Economically, integration has been a boon to all Americans one need only look at cities like Atlanta for proof. Politically, the impact of the Voting Rights Act cannot be overstated. By the end of 1966, only four states in the South had fewer than 50 percent of eligible blacks registered. By 1968 registration averaged 62 percent. Furthermore, in the sixties, only a few hundred blacks had been elected to public office now about nine thousand hold office, thanks in some part to the creation of safe minority districts that almost guaranteed a black candidate could win election.

Most interesting of all, at least as far as the White House is concerned, the electoral power of the South is more certain than ever. Before Johnson, no Southerner had been elected president since before the Civil War, yet three of the six men who succeeded him have Southern roots. &ldquoI don&rsquot think you could have had another Southern president without the Voting Rights Act,&rdquo says Katzenbach. &ldquoYou needed it to legitimize Southern politicians in the North.&rdquo The 2000 race proves the point: Front-runners George W. Bush and Al Gore each hail from former Confederate states. It&rsquos a situation that would no doubt make Johnson proud &mdash except for the fact that the candidate from Texas is a Republican.


Tarkibi

One of the plans created during attempts to desegregate the schools of Little Rock was by school superintendent Virgil Blossom. The initial approach proposed substantial integration beginning quickly and extending to all grades within a matter of many years. [4] This original proposal was scrapped and replaced with one that more closely met a set of minimum standards worked out in attorney Richard B. McCulloch's brief. [5] This finalized plan would start in September 1957 and would integrate one high school: Little Rock Central. The second phase of the plan would take place in 1960 and would open up a few junior high schools to a few black children. The final stage would involve limited desegregation of the city's grade schools at an unspecified time, possibly as late as 1963. [5]

This plan was met with varied reactions from the NAACP branch of Little Rock. Militant members like the Bateses opposed the plan on the grounds that it was "vague, indefinite, slow-moving and indicative of an intent to stall further on public integration." [6] Despite this view, the majority accepted the plan most felt that Blossom and the school board should have the chance to prove themselves, that the plan was reasonable, and that the white community would accept it.

This view was short lived, however. Changes were made to the plan, the most detrimental being a new transfer system that would allow students to move out of the attendance zone to which they were assigned. [6] The altered Blossom Plan had gerrymandered school districts to guarantee a black majority at Horace Mann High and a white majority at Hall High. [6] This meant that, even though black students lived closer to Central, they would be placed in Horace Mann thus confirming the intention of the school board to limit the impact of desegregation. [6] The altered plan gave white students the choice of not attending Horace Mann, but did not give black students the option of attending Hall. This new Blossom Plan did not sit well with the NAACP and after failed negotiations with the school board, the NAACP filed a lawsuit on February 8, 1956.

This lawsuit, along with a number of other factors contributed to the Little Rock School Crisis of 1957.

Several segregationist councils threatened to hold protests at Central High and physically block the black students from entering the school. Governor Orval Faubus deployed the Arkansas National Guard to support the segregationists on September 4, 1957. The sight of a line of soldiers blocking out the students made national headlines and polarized the nation. Regarding the accompanying crowd, one of the nine students, Elizabeth Eckford, recalled:

They moved closer and closer. . Somebody started yelling. . I tried to see a friendly face somewhere in the crowd—someone who maybe could help. I looked into the face of an old woman and it seemed a kind face, but when I looked at her again, she spat on me. [7]

On September 9, the Little Rock School District issued a statement condemning the governor's deployment of soldiers to the school, and called for a citywide prayer service on September 12. Even President Dwight Eisenhower attempted to de-escalate the situation by summoning Faubus for a meeting, warning him not to defy the Supreme Court's ruling. [8]

Woodrow Wilson Mann, the mayor of Little Rock, asked President Eisenhower to send federal troops to enforce integration and protect the nine students. In September 24, Eisenhower invoked the Insurrection Act of 1807 to enable troops to perform domestic law enforcement. The president ordered the 101st Airborne Division of the United States Army—without its black soldiers, who rejoined the division a month later—to Little Rock and federalized the entire 10,000-member Arkansas National Guard, taking it out of Faubus's control. [9]

By the end of September 1957, the nine were admitted to Little Rock Central High under the protection of the 101st Airborne Division (and later the Arkansas National Guard), but they were still subjected to a year of physical and verbal abuse by many of the white students. Melba Pattillo had acid thrown into her eyes [10] and also recalled in her book, Warriors Don't Cry, an incident in which a group of white girls trapped her in a stall in the girls' washroom and attempted to burn her by dropping pieces of flaming paper on her from above. Another one of the students, Minnijean Brown, was verbally confronted and abused. She said

I was one of the kids 'approved' by the school officials. We were told we would have to take a lot and were warned not to fight back if anything happened. One girl ran up to me and said, 'I'm so glad you're here. Won't you go to lunch with me today?' I never saw her again. [11]

Minnijean Brown was also taunted by members of a group of white male students in December 1957 in the school cafeteria during lunch. She dropped her lunch, a bowl of chili, onto the boys and was suspended for six days. Two months later, after more confrontation, Brown was suspended for the rest of the school year. She transferred to the New Lincoln School in New York City. [2] As depicted in the 1981 made-for-TV docudrama Crisis at Central High, and as mentioned by Melba Pattillo Beals in Warriors Don't Cry, white students were punished only when their offense was "both egregious and witnessed by an adult". [12] The drama was based on a book by Elizabeth Huckaby, a vice-principal during the crisis.

In the summer of 1958, as the school year was drawing to a close, Faubus decided to petition the decision by the Federal District Court in order to postpone the desegregation of public high schools in Little Rock. [13] In the Cooper v. Aaron case, the Little Rock School District, under the leadership of Orval Faubus, fought for a two and a half year delay on de-segregation, which would have meant that black students would only be permitted into public high schools in January 1961. [14] Faubus argued that if the schools remained integrated there would be an increase in violence. However, in August 1958, the Federal Courts ruled against the delay of de-segregation, which incited Faubus to call together an Extraordinary Session of the State Legislature on August 26 in order to enact his segregation bills. [15]

Claiming that Little Rock had to assert their rights and freedom against the federal decision, in September 1958, Faubus signed acts that enabled him and the Little Rock School District to close all public schools. [16] Thus, with this bill signed, on Monday September 15, Faubus ordered the closure of all four public high schools, preventing both black and white students from attending school. [17] Despite Faubus's decree, the city's population had the chance of refuting the bill since the school-closing law necessitated a referendum. The referendum, which would either condone or condemn Faubus's law, was to take place within thirty days. [17] A week before the referendum, which was scheduled to take place on September 27, Faubus addressed the citizens of Little Rock in an attempt to secure their votes. Faubus urged the population to vote against integration since he was planning on leasing the public school buildings to private schools, and, in doing so, would educate the white and black students separately. [18] Faubus was successful in his appeal and won the referendum. This year came to be known as the "Lost Year."

Faubus's victory led to a series of consequences that affected Little Rock society. Faubus and the school board's intention to open private schools was blocked by an injunction by the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, [19] which caused some citizens of Little Rock to turn on the black community. The black community became a target for hate crimes since people blamed them for the closing of the schools. [20] Daisy Bates, head of the NAACP chapter in Little Rock, was a primary victim to these crimes, in addition to the black students enrolled at Little Rock Central High School and their families. [21]

The city's teachers were also placed in a difficult position. They were forced to swear loyalty to Faubus's bills. [17] Even though Faubus's idea of private schools never played out, the teachers were still bound by their contracts and expected to attend school every day. [19] [22]

In May 1959, after the firing of forty-four teachers and administrative staff from the four high schools, three segregationist board members were replaced with three moderate ones. The new board members reinstated the forty-four staff members to their positions. [23] The new board of directors then began an attempt to reopen the schools, much to Faubus's dismay. In order to avoid any further complications, the public high schools were scheduled to open earlier than usual, on August 12, 1959. [23]

Although the Lost Year had come to a close, the black students who returned to the high schools were not welcomed by the other students. Rather, the black students had a difficult time getting past mobs to enter the school, and, once inside, they were often subject to physical and emotional abuse. [24] The students were back at school and everything would eventually resume normal function, but the Lost Year would be a pretext for new hatred toward the black students in the public high school.

Faubus's opposition to desegregation was likely both politically and racially motivated. [25] Although Faubus had indicated that he would consider bringing Arkansas into compliance with the high court's decision in 1956, desegregation was opposed by his own southern Democratic Party, which dominated all Southern politics at the time. Faubus risked losing political support in the upcoming 1958 Democratic gubernatorial primary if he showed support for integration. [26]

Most histories of the crisis conclude that Faubus, facing pressure as he campaigned for a third term, decided to appease racist elements in the state by calling out the National Guard to prevent the black students from entering Central High. Former associate justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court James D. Johnson claimed to have hoaxed Governor Faubus into calling out the National Guard, supposedly to prevent a white mob from stopping the integration of Little Rock Central High School: "There wasn't any caravan. But we made Orval believe it. We said. 'They're lining up. They're coming in droves.' . The only weapon we had was to leave the impression that the sky was going to fall." He later claimed that Faubus asked him to raise a mob to justify his actions. [27]

Harry Ashmore, the editor of the Arkansas Gazette, won a 1958 Pulitzer Prize for his editorials on the crisis. Ashmore portrayed the fight over Central High as a crisis manufactured by Faubus in his interpretation, Faubus used the Arkansas National Guard to keep black children out of Central High School because he was frustrated by the success his political opponents were having in using segregationist rhetoric to stir white voters. [28]

Congressman Brooks Hays, who tried to mediate between the federal government and Faubus, was later defeated by a last minute write-in candidate, Dale Alford, a member of the Little Rock School Board who had the backing of Faubus's allies. [29] [ self-published source ] A few years later, despite the incident with the "Little Rock Nine", Faubus ran as a moderate segregationist against Dale Alford, who was challenging Faubus for the Democratic nomination for governor in 1962.

Little Rock Central High School still functions as part of the Little Rock School District, and is now a National Historic Site that houses a Civil Rights Museum, administered in partnership with the National Park Service, to commemorate the events of 1957. [30] The Daisy Bates House, home to Daisy Bates, then the president of the Arkansas NAACP and a focal point for the students, was designated a National Historic Landmark in 2001 for its role in the episode. [31]

In 1958, Cuban poet Nicolás Guillén published "Little Rock", a bilingual composition in English and Spanish denouncing the racial segregation in the United States. [32]

Melba Pattillo Beals wrote a memoir titled Warriors Don't Cry, published in 1994.

Two made-for-television movies have depicted the events of the crisis: the 1981 CBS movie Crisis at Central High, and the 1993 Disney Channel movie The Ernest Green Story.

In 1996, seven of the Little Rock Nine appeared on The Oprah Winfrey Show. They came face to face with a few of the white students who had tormented them as well as one student who had befriended them.

In February 1999, members created the Little Rock Nine Foundation [33] which established a scholarship program which had funded, by 2013, 60 university students. [34] In 2013 the foundation decided to exclusively fund students attending the Clinton School of Public Service at the University of Arkansas. [34]

President Bill Clinton honored the Little Rock Nine in November 1999 when he presented them each with a Congressional Gold Medal. The medal is the highest civilian award bestowed by Congress. [35] It is given to those who have provided outstanding service to the country. To receive the Congressional Gold Medal, recipients must be co-sponsored by two-thirds of both the House and Senate.

In 2007, the United States Mint made available a commemorative silver dollar to "recognize and pay tribute to the strength, the determination and the courage displayed by African-American high school students in the fall of 1957." The obverse depicts students accompanied by a soldier, with nine stars symbolizing the Little Rock Nine. The reverse depicts an image of Little Rock Central High School, c. 1957. Proceeds from the coin sales are to be used to improve the National Historic Site.

On December 9, 2008, the Little Rock Nine were invited to attend the inauguration of President-elect Barack Obama, the first African-American to be elected President of the United States. [36]

On February 9, 2010, Marquette University honored the group by presenting them with the Père Marquette Discovery Award, the university's highest honor, one that had previously been given to Mother Teresa, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Karl Rahner, and the Apollo 11 astronauts.


5 times U.S. presidents deployed the military domestically

President Donald Trump called for military assistance in guarding the U.S.-Mexico border this week, arguing for the move’s necessity while his border wall is incomplete. Though sending the National Guard to the southern border comes with its own set of legal and financial challenges, it wouldn’t be the first time a U.S. president has deployed the military domestically.

Here are a few notable domestic uses of the military in American history:

Breaking up Bonus Army protests in 1932

In the midst of the Great Depression, thousands of World War I veterans gathered in Washington, D.C. to demand the government pay out the service certificate bonuses the veterans received after the war. The veterans, known as the Bonus Army, set up an Army-style camp in vacant lots and refused to leave even after a bill to pay out their bonuses was squashed in the Senate. A D.C. police effort to evict the veterans turned violent and two protestors were shot. After the failed police effort, President Herbert Hoover ordered the Army, led by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, to clear out the camps. The Army shot tear gas and torched the camp as veterans fled.

Integration in Little Rock, AR in 1957

President Dwight Eisenhower used an executive order to send troops to Little Rock, AR in 1957 to enforce the integration of Central High School. Eisenhower sent troops to Little Rock after Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus deployed the Arkansas National Guard to uphold racial segregation and block nine African American students from entering the school.

Civil right march from Selma to Montgomery in 1965

After a civil rights activist was fatally shot by Alabama state troopers, civil rights leaders organized a march from Selma to Montgomery, led by Hosea Williams and John Lewis, now a Georgia congressman. After crossing the Edmund Pettus Bridge, the marchers met a wall of state troopers, who attacked the marchers will clubs and tear gas in an incident known as Bloody Sunday. A second march took place without violence, but Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. turned the demonstrators around when troopers again blocked the bridge. After Alabama Governor George Wallace refused to issue the demonstrators protection for a third march, President Lyndon Johnson federalized the Alabama National Guard to protect the marchers as they walked towards the state capitol.

1970 U.S. postal strike

After declaring a national emergency, President Richard Nixon deployed the National Guard to New York City to distribute mail during the eight-day U.S. postal strike in 1970. At least 150,000 postal carriers joined the nationwide strike to demand higher wages and better working conditions. The effects of the strike greatly impacted the country as important government, finance, and industry documents, as well as Vietnam War draft notices, failed to be delivered.

U.S.-Mexico border in 2010

President Barack Obama deployed 1,200 National Guard troops to the Mexican border in 2010 to help combat drug trafficking and the potential for spillover violence. Obama’s deployment succeeded President George W. Bush’s Operation Jump Start, which deployed 6,000 guards to surveil the southern border in 2006.


What is the Insurrection Act and why has it been invoked before?

The last time a president invoked it for crowd control was in the 1992 LA riots.

Trump faces criticism for photo op in front of church

When President Donald Trump threatened Monday to use the active duty military to deal with nationwide violent protests over the last week, he was suggesting he might invoke a law more than 200 years old.

"If a city or state refuses to take the actions that are necessary to defend the life and property of their residents, then I will deploy the United States military and quickly solve the problem for them," he said in the White House Rose Garden.

To actually do so, he would need to employ what's known as the Insurrection Act of 1807.

What is the Insurrection Act?

Signed into law by President Thomas Jefferson in 1807, the Insurrection Act empowers the American president and commander in chief to deploy military troops within the U.S. in particular circumstances, if they believe it is necessary to quell an "insurrection" that threatens a state or its residents.

It's essentially a legal key that unlocks the door to use federal military forces -- whether through federalizing the National Guard or calling in "Title X forces" to settle civil unrest.

The exception to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which prohibits active-duty troops from being deployed to U.S. states for routine use as police forces, is an important and expansive power granted to the president.

When has it been invoked?

The Insurrection Act has rarely been invoked in the 213 years it's been on the books -- but in modern times, presidents have typically assumed the power to deal with the American agony of racial conflict, even relying on the provision to uphold federal civil rights in the Deep South.

In 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower called on the U.S. Army's 101st Airborne Division to safely escort nine black students into Little Rock Central High School after the Arkansas Gov. Orval Faubus, using the Arkansas National Guard under the guise of maintaining peace, tried to prevent the students from entering the school.

President John F. Kennedy invoked the Insurrection Act in 1962 and 1963 to send federal troops to Mississippi and Alabama to enforce civil rights laws. In 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions to Detroit when deadly riots broke out between police and residents and again invoked the law in 1968 in response to protests sparked by the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr.

And in 1992, President George H.W. Bush responded to a request from Gov. Pete Wilson of California to help quell rioting in Los Angeles after the acquittal of the four LAPD officers who brutally beat Rodney King.

The act was revised after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks to expand presidential power and though contemplated for use in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Bush administration used other authorities to send thousands of active duty troops to New Orleans.

How can it be invoked?

The Insurrection Act can be invoked at a state's request. A state legislature or governor could request assistance from the president to "to suppress [an] Insurrection."

Two other Insurrection Act provisions allow a president to invoke it regardless of a state's wishes.

One provision permits it to be invoked if the president deems it necessary "to suppress an insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination or conspiracy."

A third option -- the most generalized provision -- says the president can use the armed forces when there is an interference with federal or state law.

But first, a proclamation to disperse:

Prior to invoking the Insurrection Act, the president and the attorney general must first issue a "proclamation to disperse."

If the situation is not cleared, the president may then issue an executive order to send in troops, according to a 2006 report by the Congressional Research Service.

Has Trump invoked it?

The White House has not issued a proclamation text, and President Trump didn't use the words "Insurrection Act" in his Monday night statement.

But at least one Republican has already recommended it: Arkansas Sen. Tom Cotton, a staunch conservative, advocated on Twitter that Trump employ the 101st Airborne Division.

The most notable time 101st Airborne Division was in Cotton's home state was in 1957 when Eisenhower used the Insurrection Act to force desegregation and safely escort nine black students into Little Rock Central High School.

Illinois Gov. J.B. Pritzker, a Democrat, was quick to dispute Trump's comments, rejecting the idea that the government can send troops to his jurisdiction.

"I reject the notion that the federal government can send troops into the state of Illinois," Pritzker told CNN. "He wants to change the subject from his failure over coronavirus, a miserable failure, and now see a moment when there's unrest because of the injustice that was done to George Floyd that he now wants to create another topic and something where he can be the law and order president."

An ABC analysis:

John Cohen, former Acting Undersecretary for Intelligence at the Department of Homeland Security, who is now an ABC News contributor, noted the U.S. military, as formidable as it is, isn't trained specifically to deal with civil unrest in the U.S.

"Placing U.S. military personnel in the position of potentially using deadly force against other U.S. citizens is not something that should be done in a cavalier manner," Cohen said.

"The experience of its deployment during the Los Angeles riots faced many logistical communication and operational challenges," added Cohen, also a former police officer who worked in Los Angeles county. "It wasn't seen as a successful operation by many."

Read the original text:

The original text of the act, which has been amended several times since it was first passed on March 3, 1807, reads as follows:

"An Act authorizing the employment of the land and naval forces of the United States, in cases of insurrections. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in all cases of insurrection, or obstruction to the laws, either of the United States, or of any individual state or territory, where it is lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the militia for the purpose of suppressing such insurrection, or of causing the laws to be duly executed, it shall be lawful for him to employ, for the same purposes, such part of the land or naval force of the United States, as shall be judged necessary, having first observed all the pre-requisites of the law in that respect."